Impact
MySQLWriteTool executes arbitrary SQL provided by the caller using PDO::prepare() + execute() without semantic restrictions.
This is consistent with the name (“write tool”), but in an LLM/agent context it becomes a high-risk capability: prompt injection or indirect prompt manipulation can cause execution of destructive queries such as DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, DELETE, ALTER, or privilege-related statements (subject to DB permissions).
Who is impacted: Deployments that expose an agent with MySQLWriteTool enabled to untrusted input and/or run the tool with a DB user that has broad privileges.
Patches
Not patched in: 2.8.11
Recommended improvements (even if keeping the tool intentionally powerful):
-
Provide a safer API that supports only constrained operations (e.g., insertRecord, updateRecord) with allowlisted tables/columns.
-
Add a policy/allowlist layer (e.g., allow only INSERT/UPDATE on selected tables; forbid DROP/TRUNCATE/ALTER/GRANT).
-
Add optional review workflow: log + require human approval for high-risk statements; or “dry-run” mode.
-
Document strongly that the tool must not be exposed to untrusted prompts without additional safeguards.
Workarounds
-
Do not enable MySQLWriteTool for public/untrusted agents.
-
Use a dedicated DB user with least privilege:
- no
DROP, no ALTER, no GRANT, no access to sensitive tables unless necessary
-
Add an application-layer policy rejecting high-risk statements (DROP, TRUNCATE, ALTER, GRANT, REVOKE, CREATE USER, etc.).
-
Implement authorization gating for tool calls (RBAC, allow tool use only for trusted operators).
References
siewer Finder
Impact
MySQLWriteToolexecutes arbitrary SQL provided by the caller usingPDO::prepare()+execute()without semantic restrictions.This is consistent with the name (“write tool”), but in an LLM/agent context it becomes a high-risk capability: prompt injection or indirect prompt manipulation can cause execution of destructive queries such as
DROP TABLE,TRUNCATE,DELETE,ALTER, or privilege-related statements (subject to DB permissions).Who is impacted: Deployments that expose an agent with
MySQLWriteToolenabled to untrusted input and/or run the tool with a DB user that has broad privileges.Patches
Not patched in: 2.8.11
Recommended improvements (even if keeping the tool intentionally powerful):
Provide a safer API that supports only constrained operations (e.g.,
insertRecord,updateRecord) with allowlisted tables/columns.Add a policy/allowlist layer (e.g., allow only
INSERT/UPDATEon selected tables; forbidDROP/TRUNCATE/ALTER/GRANT).Add optional review workflow: log + require human approval for high-risk statements; or “dry-run” mode.
Document strongly that the tool must not be exposed to untrusted prompts without additional safeguards.
Workarounds
Do not enable
MySQLWriteToolfor public/untrusted agents.Use a dedicated DB user with least privilege:
DROP, noALTER, noGRANT, no access to sensitive tables unless necessaryAdd an application-layer policy rejecting high-risk statements (
DROP,TRUNCATE,ALTER,GRANT,REVOKE,CREATE USER, etc.).Implement authorization gating for tool calls (RBAC, allow tool use only for trusted operators).
References